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Wills, Trusts and Administration
of Estates
by James C. Rehberg*
A survey of developments in any area of law requires a look backward
and a look forward-a look backward at what the appellate courts have
done with controversies that developed under existing statutes and
decisions, and a look forward at what those courts will probably do with
comparable controversies that develop under recently enacted statutes.
Thus, in this survey of fiduciary law developments during the past year,
we begin with reported cases that appear to be instructive. Classifying
these cases under one heading or another is difficult, but an effort will
be made to do so in the chronological sequence in which the issues
typically appear.
I.

A.

RECENT DECISIONS-WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

PreliminaryMatters Affecting the Right to Succeed to Property

Year's Support and Creditors' Rights. The nature of the claim to
succeed to realty after the owner's death was the issue in Martin v.
Jones.' There, after the husband's death, his wife contracted to
personally pay the $3,514 burial expenses, but then failed to do so.
Instead, she filed for year's support and did not name the mortuary as
an interested party. The court awarded the wife all of the husband's
realty as a year's support. Thereafter, the holder of the mortuary's claim
sued her for the burial expenses and obtained a default judgment, which
was duly recorded in the general execution docket. She then conveyed
the realty to A, who later conveyed it to B. When the sheriff levied
* Professor Emeritus, Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Mercer
University (A.B., 1940; J.D., 1948); Duke University (LL.M., 1952). Member, State Bar of

Georgia..
1. 266 Ga. 156, 465 S.E.2d 274 (1996).
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execution on the realty and advertised it for sale to satisfy the judgment,
the wife and her transferees, A and B, sued to enjoin the sale, arguing
that the realty was not subject to levy and sale because it was year's
support property. Affirming the denial of the injunction, the Georgia
Supreme Court pointed out that the argument "misses the mark."2 No
claim had been filed against the estate of the husband, nor would any
such claim lie because the wife did not contract on behalf of his estate.3
Her contract was her personal obligation. Since the obligation was
outstanding at the time the year's support award vested title to the
realty in her fee, that fee became automatically burdened with the lien
of the default judgment.4 That judgment lien attached to all of her
property, real and personal.'
Common Law Wife of Decedent as Administrator. Following the
death of the decedent in Baynes v Baynes,6 his daughter and a woman
claiming to be his surviving common law wife, filed separate petitions for
letters of administration. The daughter challenged the validity of the
alleged common law marriage and, hence, the standing of the alleged
widow. After a full hearing, the probate court ruled that the alleged
widow failed to prove a common law marriage because she failed to
prove an essential element of all marriages, an actual contract of
marriage.7 Seldom, if ever, is there direct proof of an actual contract for
a common law marriage; thus, the marriage must be established by
circumstantial evidence over an extended period of time.8 In the fifteen
years the parties lived together the decedent never told his daughter, his
mother, his brother, or his best friend that he was married to the alleged
"spouse." His firearm license and his voter registration card showed his
mother's address as his actual place of residence. Further, the alleged
spouse herself did not list the decedent as her spouse on documents she
filed for public housing. Because there was evidence that on some
occasions the parties did not hold themselves out as husband and wife,
but instead, acted inconsistently with respect to marriage, the trial court
had evidence supporting its finding and therefore did not commit
reversible error.'

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. at 156, 465 S.E.2d at 274.
Id. at 156-57, 465 S.E.2d at 275.
Id. at 157, 465 S.E.2d at 275.
See O.C.G.A. § 9-12-80 (1993).
219 Ga. App. 848, 467 S.E.2d 195 (1996).
See O.C.G.A. § 19-3-1 (1991).
See Brown v. Brown, 234 Ga. 300, 303-04, 215 S.E.2d 671, 674 (1975).
219 Ga. App. at 849-50, 467 S.E.2d at 197.
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It should be noted that, while the operative facts of this case existed
prior to 1996, the Georgia General Assembly in that year enacted a
statute providing that no common-law marriage shall be entered into in
Georgia on or after January 1, 1997.10
Virtual Legitimation. In Prince v. Black," the supreme court first
recognized the doctrine of virtual or equitable legitimation, allowing a
virtually legitimated child to share in the estate of the father if there
was clear and convincing evidence that the child was the natural child
of the father, and that the father intended for the child to share in his
intestate estate "in the same manner that the child would have shared
if he had been formally legitimated." 2 In 1991 the General Assembly
amended the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A." or "Code")
section governing inheritance by children born out of wedlock to
incorporate the holding in Prince v. Black. It did this by enacting a new
subsection. 3
In Varner v. Sharp, 4 the court of appeals construed this new
subsection. Upon the decedent's death, his brother applied for letters of
administration, claiming to be the sole heir. A few weeks later Dorothy
Varner also applied for these letters, claiming that she was the
decedent's child born out of wedlock and that she was his sole heir.
When each filed a caveat to the application of the other, the probate
court found clear and convincing evidence that Dorothy was the
intestate's child, but it did not find clear and convincing evidence that
he intended for her to inherit the estate to the exclusion of the brother.
Consequently, it concluded that she could not inherit from the estate.' 5
The court of appeals reversed this holding, in essence stating that it
read the statutory language of the subsection, "in the same manner in
which the child would have shared if legitimate," as meaning "to the
same extent to which the child would have shared if legitimate" or "in
the exact same proportion in which the child would have shared if
legitimate."" The probate court's reading of the statute imposed upon
the daughter a greater burden of proof than is required. 7 That reading
would assume that a layman knows the rules of inheritance and would
require that he leave clear and convincing evidence that he intended the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

O.C.G.A. § 19-3-1.1 (Supp. 1996).
256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986).
Id. at 80, 344 S.E.2d at 412.
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4 (cX1)(E) (1995).
219 Ga. App. 125, 464 S.E.2d 388 (1995).
Id. at 125, 464 S.E.2d at 388.
Id. at 126, 464 S.E.2d at 389.
Id., 464 S.E.2d at 388-89.
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daughter to share in the estate as provided in those rules.'" The court
of appeals concluded that the phrase "in the same manner in which the
child would have shared if legitimate" means nothing more than "as if
she were legitimate." 9 If the daughter, on remand, proves that the
decedent was her father and that he intended for her to inherit from his
estate, then the probate court must determine based on the rules of
intestate succession the extent of the estate to which she is entitled.2 °
The brother also contended that the probate court erred in finding that
there was clear and convincing evidence that Dorothy was the decedent's
daughter. The court disagreed and enumerated the many bits of
evidence which were introduced to prove the virtual legitimation,2'
making out what appears to the writer to be an even stronger case than
was made in Prince v Black.22
Contracts to Will. The 1983 divorce decree in Lattimore v.
Meadows' obligated the husband to reaffirm his 1981 will in which he
left his entire estate to his wife. When he executed a new will in 1984,
he again complied with the decree. In 1991 he executed a codicil
bequeathing one hundred thousand dollars to another person. When the
(then) ex-husband died in 1994, his 1984 will and the 1991 codicil were
admitted to probate. The (now) ex-wife sued the executor for specific
performance of the contract to will. The supreme court affirmed
summary judgment in favor of the ex-wife on the theory that the divorce
24
decree operated as a contract to leave the entire estate to the ex-wife.
Accordingly, the 1991 codicil, while valid as a codicil, contravened the
25
terms of the divorce decree and was a breach of the contract to will.
The principles of estoppel barred even the raising of the issue of a
contract to will in Scoggins v. Strickland.26 There, the will named as
coexecutors the testator's second wife and his stepson (the son of his first
wife from her previous marriage). The evidence disclosed that during
his life the testator had transferred certain stock to the second wife, had
changed his bank account to a joint account with her, and had named
her as beneficiary of his life insurance. At his death, his will left a life
estate in the marital residence to her and the residue to the stepson and

18.
19.

Id. at 126-27, 464 S.E.2d at 389.
Id. at 127, 464 S.E.2d at 389.

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Id., 464 S.E.2d at 390.
256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986).
266 Ga. 640, 468 S.E.2d 745 (1996).
Id. at 640-41, 468 S.E.2d at 746.

25. Id.
26. 265 Ga. 417, 456 S.E.2d 208 (1995).
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the stepson's two daughters. After the second wife and the stepson
qualified as coexecutors, the stepson sued the wife, alleging that the
testator had breached an oral contract to leave everything to the stepson
because he devised the life estate in the realty to the wife and made his
bank account a joint account with her. After the jury found that a
contract to will existed and that the testator had breached it, the trial
court entered a judgment cancelling the wife's life estate in the residence
and awarding it, along with the funds in the joint account, to the
stepson.27
The supreme court reversed on this issue, holding that the stepson
was estopped from asserting a contract to will claim against the estate
after he had qualified as coexecutor.2" Trustees and other fiduciaries
are estopped from asserting a title adverse to their trust.2 9
B.

Jurisdiction
Issues of a court's jurisdiction to entertain a case, or to make a
particular ruling in one, are often found intertwined with issues of
substantive law. Two recent cases serve as examples. In Kesler v.
Watts,3" the will contained an in terrorem clause which did not contain
a gift over in the event of a contest.31 When it was offered for probate
a granddaughter, who was left a portion of the estate, filed a complaint
in superior court for declaratory and injunctive relief. She asked for a
declaration that the in terrorem clause was invalid and that the court
enjoin the probate court from entering any substantive order in the case.
The appeal was from the superior court's finding that the granddaughter
was not an "interested party" qualified to bring the declaratory judgment
action, and further, that she did not present a justiciable controversy as
required for this action. 2
The court of appeals agreed that while the superior court generally
has power to issue injunctions, it does not have the power to enjoin the
judge of another court from exercising his judicial powers.
An
injunction issued by a superior court can only be addressed to parties
before that court, and the probate judge was not such a party."4 The
27. Id. at 417, 456 S.E.2d at 208-09.
28. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 209.

29. Id., 456 S.E.2d at 208 (citing O.C.G.A. § 24-4-26 (1995)). In Scoggins, the court
cited numerous instances in which executors and administrators had sought, as
individuals, to obtain title to all or part of the estate they represented. Id.

30. 218 Ga. App. 104, 460 S.E.2d 822 (1995).
31. Id. at 105, 460 S.E.2d at 823.

32. O.C.G.A. § 9-4-2 (1982).
33. 218 Ga. App. at 105, 460 S.E.2d at 823.
34. Id., 460 S.E.2d at 823-24.
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trial court was in error, however, in holding that the granddaughter was
not an "interested party," and being neither an heir nor a legatee under
an earlier will, had nothing to gain from a possible finding that the in
terrorem clause was invalid. 5 As a legatee she had a direct interest
in the estate and, therefore, could clearly establish that a justiciable
controversy existed.36 The statute specifically so provides.37
Yancey v. Hall3 clarified the appellate jurisdiction of the superior
court. After the probate court disposed of several caveats in favor of the
propounder, the will was admitted to probate, and an appeal to the
superior court followed. The superior court affirmed the decision to
admit the will, but then it ordered the propounder's removal as executor.
The matter of removal had not previously been considered; the only issue
in the probate court was the validity of the will. On appeal, the court
of appeals reversed the order of removal.3 9 Because the issue of
removal of the executor had not been raised in probate court, the only
issue before it was that of the admissibility of the will to probate.
Because the probate court was limited to that issue, the jurisdiction of
the superior court was similarly limited. The caveator argued that the
issue had been raised in the amended caveat by the request for "any and
further relief that the court may deem just and equitable" and by the
fact that a court of equity has the power "to supervise the administration
of an estate to see that justice is done."4' The Georgia Supreme Court
disagreed.4 1 The superior court was not sitting as a court of equity but
as an appellate court that "has only the jurisdiction of the [probate]
court.. ., which has no equitable powers in such a case."42
C. Probate of Wills
Instanter Probate. The principles of estoppel come into play when
the heirs are all sui juris and assent to probate instanter. In Clark v.
Clark,4 the widow and son of the testator, as the only heirs, signed an
acknowledgment of service and an assent to probate of the will instanter;
then, the chief clerk of the probate court executed an order admitting the
will to record by affixing the signature of the probate judge. Five

35. Id. at 106, 460 S.E.2d at 824.
36. Id.
37. O.C.G.A. § 9-4-4(a)(3) (1982).

38. 265 Ga.466, 458 S.E.2d 121 (1995).
39. Id. at 468, 458 S.E.2d at 123.
40. Id.
41. Id., 458 S.E.2d at 122.

42. Id. (citing Byrd v. Riggs, 209 Ga. 59, 60(2)(a), 70 S.E.2d 755 (1952)).
43. 265 Ga. 434, 457 S.E.2d 564 (1995).

1996]

WILLS AND TRUSTS

months later the son filed a caveat, but the probate court awarded
summary judgment to the widow. The son then appealed to the superior
court contending that the order admitting the will was not signed by the
probate judge. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the
grant of summary judgment to the widow.44 The court held that the
son was estopped from challenging the will after he had formally
acknowledged service and consented to probate with full knowledge of
the contents of the will.45

Since it was undisputed that the probate

judge had expressly authorized the chief clerk to affix the judge's
signature to the order, the Georgia Supreme Court saw no need to decide
whether this was a proper delegation of authority.4 The son's assent
to probate instanter estopped him from later challenging that delegation.47
Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence. In Bishop v.
Kenny,4" a will executed three years before the testatrix's death at the
age of eighty-six left the entire estate to a niece. When she offered it for
probate, a granddaughter who was then serving as the testatrix's legal
guardian filed a caveat alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence. An appeal followed the admission of the will to probate. The
Georgia Supreme Court held, first, that testimony as to why the
granddaughter became guardian of the testatrix three years after
execution of the will was too remote to show capacity at the time of
execution; second, that while expert testimony that the testatrix was
diagnosed with degenerative dementia three months after execution of
the will may have been properly admitted, testimony as to lack of
capacity two years thereafter was too remote and was properly excluded;
and third, that while testimony as to the source and history of the
testatrix's real property may be relevant to show the reasonableness of
the testamentary scheme, testimony of the caveator that she "believed"
that she and her brother were to receive certain real property was
inadmissible.49 The testimony of a disappointed recipient had no
bearing on either the source of the property or the testamentary capacity
of the testatrix.5" While there was testimony as to the testatrix's
forgetfulness and repetitive mannerisms, there was also testimony that

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 434, 457 S.E.2d at 564.
Id.
Id.
Id.
266 Ga. 231, 466 S.E.2d 581 (1996).

49. Id. at 231-32, 466 S.E.2d at 582-83.
50. Id.at 232, 466 S.E.2d at 583.
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she regularly knew friends and relatives, conversed logically with them,
and gave the draftsman logical reasons for the dispositions made of
property. Her testimony was ample evidence of the requisite mental
capacity to make her will. The only other evidence offered to show
undue influence was that the niece drove the testatrix to the attorney's
office for execution of the will at a time when the caveator was away on
vacation and that the niece was present during the execution of the will.
None of this was evidence of any force, influence, or fear that would
destroy the free agency of the testatrix. 51
Another case in which a will was challenged on the grounds of lack of
capacity and undue influence is interesting not only with regard to these
matters, but also with regard to the manner in which the case went to
the supreme court. In Andrews v. Wilbanks,52 the will left one-half of
the estate to certain relatives and the other one-half to an attorney who
had served as guardian of the person and property of the testatrix since
1983. The relatives filed a caveat, asserting that the attorney, while in
a fiduciary relationship, had exercised undue influence in that he had
deceived the testatrix by appearing to visit her frequently and to care for
her wants and needs while, unbeknownst to her, he was charging her for
all this time and attention. To show at the trial that this amounted to
undue influence, the relatives filed a motion in limine asking that the
court permit a showing of the amount of compensation paid to the
attorney. The probate court entered a rule in limine but refused to
permit the evidence showing the amount of compensation. It then
granted the relatives' application for an interlocutory appeal, which was
accepted by the supreme court. The supreme court then ruled that the
probate court erred on this point.5 3 By its very nature the grant of a
motion in limine that excludes certain evidence suggests that there are
no circumstances under which the evidence is likely to be admissible at
trial." This was too far-reaching.55 The court suggested that there
may be situations in which proof of the guardian's compensation may be
relevant in the later proceedings of this case. 6
Fees of Named Executor. The court of appeals faced a narrow
57 There,
problem of statutory construction in Holland v. Farmer.
petitioner offered for probate a will of a named testator that was dated

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 234, 466 S.E.2d at 584.
265 Ga. 555, 458 S.E.2d 817 (1995).
Id. at 556, 458 S.E.2d at 818.
Id.
Id.
Id.
217 Ga. App. 546, 458 S.E.2d 175 (1995).
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April 23, 1988, and named petitioner as executrix. A caveat was filed by
another person, who offered for probate a later will of the same testator,
dated May 31, 1990. After a jury returned a verdict in favor of the later
will and against the earlier one, the petitioner was denied attorney fees
on the ground that her efforts to probate the earlier will "were efforts to
defeat a later dated last will and testament."58
The petitioner contended that one Code section" required her to
"offer" the will that named her as executrix as soon as practicable after
the death of the testator and that another section 0 entitled her, as
named executrix in a purported will, to recover expenses from the estate
for "offering" the will for probate even if the purported will turns out not
to be valid. The trial court concluded that petitioner's personal interest
(as named executrix) in the probate of the earlier will, and with full
knowledge of the existence of the later will, precluded a finding that she
proceeded in good faith, as required by the last cited Code section.'
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's reasoning but
upheld its judgment. 2 "The mere fact that a propounder of an earlier
will attempts to 'defeat' a later will does not prove that the propounder
did not act in good faith."" Also, lack of good faith is not conclusively
shown by evidence that the propounder of the earlier will has a
"personal interest" in it." "Any person who propounds a will under
O.C.G.A. section 53-3-23 may necessarily be attempting to 'defeat'
another will which he or she believes to be invalid, and it may also be
the case that he has a 'personal interest' in it."' Notwithstanding
these principles, the court of appeals concluded that the evidence in this
case supported the trial court's implicit conclusion that the propounder
did not act in good faith." The specific evidence supporting this
implicit conclusion consisted of the following: first, testimony of the
propounder that a certain handwriting expert had indicated that the
signature on a particular deed was not that of the testator, while that
same expert testified at this trial that he had given no such indication;
and second, while the propounder contended that the testator was
incompetent when he made the later will, she had only seen him once in
many months before his death, while many of the witnesses who had

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 547, 458 S.E.2d at 176.
O.C.G.A. § 53-3-4 (1995).
Id. § 53-3-23.
217 Ga. App. at 547, 458 S.E.2d at 176.
Id.
Id. at 546, 458 S.E.2d at 176.

64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 548, 458 S.E.2d at 176.
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known him for years testified as to his good mental capacity at the time
of execution of the later will.y

Family Settlements. Family settlements of disputes arising over
the estate of a decedent are basically contractual and are encouraged by
statute if all the parties are adult and sui juris.68 The basic issue in
Hennessey v. Froehlich 9 was whether the parties had reached an
agreement. The principal disputed asset was a seventy-five thousand
dollar certificate of deposit which was in the names of the testator and
a daughter (defendant) and which had been cashed by the daughter.
After court-ordered mediation the other children sued the defendant for
enforcement of an agreement that the parties' attorneys reached by
telephone. After each side moved for summary judgment, the probate
court granted the motion of the daughter, finding that the parties had
failed to agree as to disposition of the certificate of deposit. The court
of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, sending the case back
down with three pointed instructions: (1) The attorney's notes indicated
that any asset not specifically allocated would go to the defendant
daughter, thus contradicting the trial court's finding that the parties'
agreement failed to cover the certificate; (2) The understanding of the
children that disposition of certain keepsake items would be resolved
after agreement did not preclude a finding that the agreement was final.
Parties frequently agree to resolve certain minor details after the
making of a contract; (3) The fact that the agreement was oral did not
render it unenforceable, notwithstanding the language in the statute
that the agreement be assented to in writing by all the interested
parties.70 The theory appears to be that there would be no other
possible parties with standing to challenge the agreement if it were
proved.
Mistake. Georgia law provides that in the case of a will executed
under a mistake of fact as to the existence or the conduct of an heir the
will shall be inoperative as to that heir."' In Kaplan v. Kaplan72 the
issue was whether an alleged mistake was one of fact or of law. There,
the testator's wife alleged that he was mistaken about her conduct in
signing an enforceable antenuptial agreement. The supreme court
affirmed the probate court's dismissal of her caveat for failure to state

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 547-48, 458 S.E.2d at 176-77.
O.C.G.A. § 53-3-22 (1995).
219 Ga. App. 98, 464 S.E.2d 246 (1995).
Id. at 99-100, 464 S.E.2d at 248. See O.C.G.A. § 53-3-22(b) (1995).

71.

O.C.G.A. § 53-2-8 (1995).

72. 266 Ga. 612, 469 S.E.2d 198 (1996).
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a claim.73 The flaw in her argument was that the caveat did not allege
a mistake of fact, but of judgment." Her conduct was her signing the
antenuptial agreement, and the testator was not mistaken as to that
Whether he believed that the agreement was valid was a
fact.
judgment of the law, not an issue of fact.76
II.

RECENT DECISIONs-TRusTs

Trust or No Trust?
The answer to this question determines the applicability of the
principles of trust law, but the question is not one which is easily
answered. As illustrated in Dismuke v. Abbott,77 what we call a trust

A.

is not necessarily a trust. This case was a declaratory judgment action
in which the court had to distinguish a "trust account" as defined in the
financial institutions code 78 from a true trust governed by the trust
code.79 In 1988, a husband and wife each purchased savings certificates and set up a trust account which was designated on the bank's
signature card as a "Revocable Trust." The one set up by the husband
named himself as trustee and his wife as beneficiary, while the one set
up by the wife named herself as trustee and her husband as beneficiary.
Each of these certificates was to mature in February 1989.0
When the husband died in 1988 the funds in the account naming him
as trustee were paid to the wife. When the one naming her as trustee
matured, she took possession of the proceeds. After her death in 1991,
the estate of the husband, being administered by the plaintiff, filed this
declaratory judgment action, claiming the funds from both trust
accounts. The wife's estate answered that the funds from both accounts
passed to her and into her estate. The plaintiff, a daughter representing
her father's estate, filed an affidavit stating that her father had told her
that he had "'opened other accounts solely for the purpose of maintaining the insurability of the funds on deposit'; and that 'the only deposits
[he] had, other than some joint certificates of deposit, were the trust
accounts."'' 1 Therefore, he must have intended for the accounts to

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 613, 469 S.E.2d at 199.
Id. at 612-13, 469 S.E.2d at 198.
Id.
Id. at 613, 469 S.E.2d at 198.
217 Ga. App. 524, 457 S.E.2d 837 (1995).
O.C.G.A. § 7-1-810 (14) (1989).
Id. § 53-12-1 (1995).
217 Ga. App. at 524, 457 S.E.2d at 838.
Id.
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serve only purposes of insurability and for them to pass into his estate
and not to the wife. The trial court denied a motion by the wife's estate
for summary judgment, but on an interlocutory appeal the court of
appeals reversed. 2 Despite the confusion created by the designation
of each account as a "Revocable Trust," the court concluded that the
deposit form came within the description of a "trust account" as defined
in the financial institutions code.' Unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary in the trust agreement (the deposit), the
account belongs beneficially to the "trustee" during his lifetime14 and
after his death to the person named as beneficiary.8" Here, the court
concluded that there was no clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.6
B.

Resulting Trust

An attempt to assert a purchase-money resulting trust failed in Stone
v. Williams. 7 The widow of an intestate decedent sued to eject his
sister from a residential lot which the decedent had purchased in 1959,
and on which the sister had resided until the decedent's death in 1993.
The sister filed a counterclaim seeking the declaration of a resulting
trust on the ground that she had given the decedent five hundred dollars
toward the two thousand dollar purchase price of the lot. Legal title was
in the decedent at all times. The supreme court affirmed the trial
court's grant of a summary judgment in favor of the widow. 8
An equitable action, as the one asserted in the counterclaim, is barred
if the truth cannot be fairly established because of a long delay in
asserting the claim. 9 It would be inequitable to allow the sister to
assert a resulting trust claim after she had waited thirty-five years
when, during all this time, legal ownership of the property was in the
decedent and knowledge of that fact was easily discoverable.9 " Laches
will not arise from delay alone; prejudice must also be shown.9
Prejudice to the widow was shown by the long delay and by the fact that

82. Id. at 526, 457 S.E.2d at 840.
83. Id. at 525, 457 S.E.2d at 840. See O.C.G.A. § 7-1-810(14) (1989).
84. 217 Ga. App. at 526, 457 S.E.2d at 839. See O.C.G.A. § 7-1-812(c) (1989).
85. 217 Ga. App. at 526, 457 S.E.2d at 839. See O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813(c) (1989).
86. 217 Ga. App. at 526, 457 S.E.2d at 839.
87. 265 Ga. 480, 458 S.E.2d 343 (1995).
88. Id. at 480, 458 S.E.2d at 344.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Id.
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the decedent's death rendered ascertainment of the truth extremely
difficult, if not impossible. 2
C.

Support TRust
The case of Ivey v. Ivey9" is instructive on the subject of support
trusts. In that case, a settlor set up an irrecovable trust for his son,
Richard, providing for Richard's life-time support with remainder to the
descendants of Richard. The settlor's other son, David, was named as
trustee. Later, Richard, the life beneficiary, conveyed some of his own
real property to the trust to become a part of the trust assets. Thereafter, the trustee conveyed the real property to the settlor by a security
deed in consideration for the settlor's voluntary satisfaction of some
personal debts of Richard, the life beneficiary."4
Thereafter, Richard brought suit against the trustee seeking: (1)
cancellation of his conveyance of the realty to the trust; (2) cancellation
of the trustee's conveyance of that realty by security deed to the settlor;
and (3) removal of the trustee and termination of the trust. After a
bench trial, the trial court granted the trustee's motion for dismissal.
On appeal, the supreme court affirmed in part and reversed in part.95
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's involuntary dismissal of
the cancellation claim because the beneficiary's claim that he did not
recall signing the deed conveying the realty to the trust was insufficient
to raise an issue of fraud that would justify cancellation on the ground
of a legal mistake. 6 Fraud will not be presumed but must be shown
by evidence. 97
The trustee's conveyance of the realty to the settlor for the purpose of
satisfying some personal debts of the beneficiary was beyond the power
of the trustee; hence, the security deed should have been cancelled.9"
The trustee had no power, express or implied, to encumber the trust
property for a nontrust purpose. 99 The actual trust purpose was
expressly stated to be the support of the beneficiary. The court noted
that the trust instrument incorporated by reference many statutory
powers, one of which is the power to sell or encumber trust property; 100
92. Id. at 481, 458 S.E.2d at 344.
93. 266 Ga. 143, 465 S.E.2d 434 (1996).
94. Id. at 143-44, 465 S.E.2d at 436.
95. Id. at 143-44, 146, 465 S.E.2d at 436, 438.

96. Id. at 144, 465 S.E.2d at 436.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 145, 465 S.E.2d at 437.
99. Id. at 144, 465 S.E.2d at 437.
100. Id. at 144-45, 465 S.E.2d at 437 (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-12-232(8)(d), (11)(b) & (12)

(1995)).
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nevertheless, all of these powers must be exercised for the accomplishment of valid trust purposes.'O Here, the only trust purpose was
support of the beneficiary and preservation of the trust assets for the
remainder beneficiaries. 10 2

The supreme court affirmed the trial court's refusal to remove the
trustee." Although he erroneously executed the security deed, that
alone does not demand a finding that he was guilty of fraud or other
°
Where, as here, the
breach which would demand his dismissal.'O
settlor selects the trustee, courts are reluctant to remove him.0" Nor
did the court err in refusing to terminate the trust.1°6 The trust's
purpose to support the life beneficiary has not yet been accomplished.' 7 Another valid reason for refusal to terminate was that
there were other beneficiaries-the descendants of the life beneficiary.108

D. Charitable TRusts
Gustafson v. Wesley Foundation"° well illustrated the public policy
favoring charitable trusts. The will left one-half of the residue of the
estate to the "Wesley Foundation, University of Minnesota," a Methodist
student organization in which the testatrix was active during her college
days in the 1920's and 1930's. That organization continued to minister
to Methodist students until 1967 when it transferred its assets to the
"Metropolitan Methodist Campus Ministry" which continued to minister
to the university students. "Wesley Foundation" ceased to exist.
Beginning in 1974, "Metropolitan" carried on its same work but has
since ministered to the needs of students who are members of five
Protestant churches, one of which was the United Methodist Church of
the University of Minnesota. As a participating member, "Metropolitan"
has actively supported ecumenical campus ministries similar to those
once supported by "Wesley Foundation. " "'
After the death of the testatrix in 1993 her sole heir argued in a will
construction action that the above developments had resulted in a lapse
of the share of the residue left to "Wesley Foundation," since that body

101.

Id. at 145, 465 S.E.2d at 437.
102. Id.

103, Id.
104. Id.

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 146, 465 S.E.2d at 438.
Id. at 145, 465 S.E.2d at 437.
Id. at 146, 465 S.E.2d at 438.
266 Ga. 679, 469 S.E.2d 160 (1996).
Id. at 679-80, 469 S.E.2d at 161-62.
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no longer existed. However, the supreme court affirmed the finding that
"Metropolitan," as successor to "Wesley Foundation," was entitled to the
The court stated the traditional approach that where a
bequest.'
named charitable beneficiary merges or consolidates with another
similar entity, the new entity will be entitled to the bequest if its aims
and purposes are similar to those of the named beneficiary."' The
court felt that the fact that "Metropolitan" had joined with other, nonMethodist denominations in ministering to students did not defeat the
bequest because the testatrix did not condition it in such a way as to
restrict the beneficiary's participation in an ecumenical Protestant
mission."' The supreme court also agreed with the trial court's
conclusion that because there was still an existing qualified beneficiary,
4
there was no occasion for the application of the cy pres doctrine."
The attempt to claim another benefit of the public policy favoring
charities, that of exemption from ad valorem taxes, failed in Zach, Inc.
v. Fulton County."' There, a nonprofit corporation which owned
property used as a fraternity house on the Georgia Tech campus claimed
exemption from ad valorem taxation, asserting that it was the use of the
property which was determinative. After the trial court denied the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment but certified the 6case for
immediate review, the court of appeals affirmed the decision.1
The controlling statute provides that "all buildings erected for and
used as a college" are exempt from taxation." 7 The court of appeals
examined the two leading cases in which the supreme court had
construed this statute." 8 Alford v. Emory University"9 held that
fraternity houses owned by a university were exempt. This holding was
extended in Johnson v. Southern Greek Housing Corp.,2 ' to hold that
the statute exempted fraternity houses even if they were not actually
owned by a college but were, instead, owned by a nonprofit corporation
which had been created by a college as an "arm and extension" of the
college. In the instant case, however, the taxpayer corporation that

111. Id. at 681, 469 S.E.2d at 162.
112. Id. at 680, 469 S.E.2d at 162. As authority for this traditional approach the court
cited one Massachusetts and three New York cases, suggesting the death of Georgia
authority on this admittedly traditional approach. Id.
113. Id. at 681, 469 S.E.2d at 162.
114. Id.
115. 217 Ga. App. 315, 457 S.E.2d 574 (1995).
116. Id. at 316, 457 S.E.2d at 575.
117. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(aX6) (1991)).
118. Id. at 315, 457 S.E.2d at 574.
119. 216 Ga. 391, 116 S.E.2d 596 (1960).
120. 251 Ga. 544, 307 S.E.2d 491 (1983).
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owned the house was created by a national fraternity and was run by a
board made up of members from outside the college community. The
the outer
court of appeals concluded that those two cases represent
21
limits of circumstances that will justify exemption.
III. PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION
A.

PrecatoryLanguage
Language in a will that refers to the testator's wish, desire, or request
regarding a disposition of property is an invitation to litigation. The will
in Garrett v. Morton122 was this type of will. After a specific devise of
"any interest in real estate I may own at the time of my death" to a
named daughter, the will continued: "[I]t is my request but not absolute
direction" that a named sister-in-law should pay real estate taxes and
insurance
and in return should be entitled to live on the property until
23
1

death.

The trial court construed the will to leave to the sister-in-law a life
estate in the property, but the supreme court reversed the decision on
this point.124 Because the will first unequivocally left all real property
to the daughter and because, on the other hand, it used language of
request only regarding the sister-in-law, the express language used in
the devise to the daughter prevailed over the vague language that only
suggested a life estate in the sister-in-law.125 As further evidence, the
court presumed that the
testatrix would prefer that her property pass
6
within her bloodline.12

B.

Renunciation and Acceleration
The will under scrutiny in Wetherbee v. First State Bank & Trust

Co.127 left property in marital and residuary trusts to the wife for life,

remainder in trust for the support and maintenance of the testator's two
then living sons for life, but if any son should predecease his mother,
"[t]hen his interest shall vest in his then surviving unmarried wife and
in his then surviving descendants.""2s

217 Ga. App. at 315-16, 457 S.E.2d at 575.
265 Ga. 394, 458 S.E.2d 618 (1995).
Id. at 394, 458 S.E.2d at 618.
Id.
Id.
Id.
266 Ga. 364, 466 S.E.2d 835 (1996).
128. Id. at 364, 466 S.E.2d at 835.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
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After the testator's death, each of the sons, pursuant to the Georgia
renunciation statute, 129 duly renounced his interest, and each of them
thereafter divorced. After the death of the testator's widow, in 1991, the
trustee filed a bill for construction as to whether the renunciations
accelerated the vesting of the interest in each son's "then surviving
unmarried wife and ...his then surviving descendants.""

The trial

court ruled that no acceleration had occurred and that the income that
would have been paid to each son should be accumulated and upon his
death paid to his then surviving wife and descendants. The supreme
court affirmed this ruling.1"'
The renunciation statute in Georgia codifies the common-law principle
that a testator is presumed to have intended the devise of a remainder
to take effect at the termination of the precedent estate, rather than at
the death of the owner of it."2 However, this presumption is rebuttable if the testator has indicated otherwise. 133 The indication need not
be expressed; it may be shown by implications found in the will."3 4
Examining this will and its implications, the court noted that the
testator did not identify by name the wife or descendants of his sons
whom he wished to take.135 Instead, they were identified by class
descriptions only, suggesting futurity, and the time for ascertainment of
those takers is impliedly the actual deaths of the sons, not the determination (by renunciation) of the sons' interests.3 6
IV.

LEGISLATION

A New Statute of Wills
In 1991, the General Assembly of Georgia enacted a comprehensive
revision of Georgia's trust law. 37 In 1996, it continued this revision
of Georgia's fiduciary law by enacting a comprehensive revision of
chapters 1 through 11 of Title 53.13 This recent revision, primarily
affecting wills and intestacy, will be effective only for the estates of

A.

129. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 53-2-115(c) (1995)).

130. Id., 466 S.E.2d at 836.
131. Id. at 366, 466 S.E.2d at 837.
132. Id. at 365, 466 S.E.2d at 836.

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 366, 466 S.E.2d at 836.
137. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-1 to -394 (1995).
138. Id. § 53-1-1 to 53-11-11 (Supp. 1996).
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decedents dying on or after January 1, 1998,"39 thus giving the General Assembly of 1997 an opportunity to consider any proposals for further
change in this 1996 act.
With this enactment, Georgia has updated almost all of its fiduciary
law. The principal exception is its law of guardianship and that, too,
seems slated for revision. The 1996 session approved, and the Governor
signed, a resolution creating the Joint Guardianship Rewrite Committee. 4° This committee is charged with the responsibility of submitting
an interim report no later than December 1, 1996, and shall stand
abolished on that date.
B.

Affidavit of Self-Proved Will
The General Assembly amended the statute authorizing the selfproving of wills141 to allow affidavits of the testator and attesting
witnesses to be made before a duly qualified officer of the state "where
the will or codicil was executed" rather than "under the laws of this
state."
C.

Common-Law MarriagesProhibited

Although there appears to be no specific statute on the subject of
common-law marriage in Georgia, its validity has been recognized as far
back as 1860.142 However, its prospective demise has now been made
a matter of legislative record. The 1996 session of the General Assembly
enacted a new Code section providing that no common-law marriage
shall be entered into in this state on or after January 1, 1997, but that
otherwise valid common-law marriages entered into prior to that date
shall continue to be recognized."
V.

CONCLUSION

With the enactment of a new trust code in 1991 and of a new wills and
intestacy code in 1996, Georgia appears to have made great progress in
the codification of its fiduciary law. The anticipated report of the Joint
Guardianship Rewrite Committee should further enhance this progress.

139. Id. § 53-1-1.

140. S. Res. 399; 1996 Ga. Laws 901.
141. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-5 (1995).
142. See Askew v. Dupree, 30 Ga. 173 (1860).
143. O.C.G.A. § 19-3-1.1 (Supp. 1996). For a recent case in which an alleged commonlaw widow claimed priority as administratrix of the estate of her alleged common-law
husband, turning on whether a valid common-law marriage existed at his death, see
Baynes v. Baynes, 219 Ga. App. 848, 467 S.E.2d 195 (1996).

